

## How can Police and Crime Commissioners help cut crime and disorder?

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### **Lord Wasserman**

*Government adviser, Policing and Criminal Justice*

I welcome this opportunity because I'm very happy about the title you've chosen. I think it's the first time I've addressed an audience that is expecting some words about fighting crime. The debate about Police and Crime Commissioners has degenerated, since it's come to Parliament, into a slanging match about particular, minor details, and it really upsets me because it wouldn't be worth undergoing all these changes if it was simply a matter of tinkering with local authority structures. But that's what people love talking about: if you read Hansard, all the really good speeches by the cleverest police experts have been about detailed matters of structure and accountability, and auditing, and finance - there's been nothing about crime. I don't think the words 'fighting crime', or 'reducing crime', or 'tackling antisocial behaviour' have been mentioned by anyone in any debate, except by Baroness Newlove. At the second reading debate, she said: "Why have we let our lovely towns and villages, so charming by day, turn into dark cities at night, infested with drunken brawling, people vomiting and causing chaos? They cost us billions of pounds, their violence immeasurable in lost innocent lives." That, on the whole, was regarded by some members as really rather in bad taste. We shouldn't be talking about vomiting in the House of Lords chamber - we should be talking about much higher, cleaner, nicer things! But Helen Newlove, unlike most people in the debate, lived in that kind of community. Helen Newlove actually knows what it's like to suffer from antisocial behaviour: her own husband was killed in a vicious attack. But most people in the debate love talking about other issues: the threat to operational independence of the police; the dangers of political extremists becoming PCCs; reconnecting with the public; giving the Police and Crime Panels sharper teeth; value for money; the risk of corruption; the size of force areas; and whether this is an American model or not.

So no one's actually addressed the question that today's session is meant to address: is this going to make the country safer, is it going to make our council estates more liveable? If it's not going to do any of that, then it's not worth having. I want to talk to you about that today, because I believe that's what it's all about. The Government hasn't got the message across clearly enough: this is a policy that has been introduced in order to make the country safer, and I'm going to talk about why this is the case, and why it is a very significant change, not just a bit of tinkering. Police authorities have done a good job, there's no question about that, but I think that this will make the country safer. Let me explain why.

There's been a debate about whether this is an American model or not. Of course, it's not in the conventional sense: had we had a situation in which the mayors were responsible, that might have been argued as an American model, but this is very different, and it's very different because our police forces are very different. We have police forces that don't correspond narrowly to jurisdictions or communities in the way we understand them, but in America, policing is very much a local community matter. Even in New York, where you have a police force that is as large as the Metropolitan Police, it's very much the local police force. We don't have that, so we're talking about a very different policing environment. But there is something I've learned from the American experience that lies beneath the argument about policing, and that is about the role of leadership in policing. I want to talk to you about this, because I think it's been missed in the discussion about Police and Crime Commissioners.

In New York in the 1980s and 90s, crime was out of control. Not many people visited New York because it was regarded as too dangerous, businesses were moving out, house prices were falling - it was the end of New York. In 1990, there were 2,245 murders in New York, and yet no one blamed the police. It wasn't a policing matter, it was something about living in big cities, racism, poverty, bad housing, poor education, dysfunctional families, unemployment- these were the factors to which this enormous crime wave was attributed. Even the police chiefs were regarded as doing a good job; it wasn't a question of it being the police chiefs' fault, and in fact confidence in the police was very high, because expectations were so low. The view was that 'it's a jungle out there', these people are putting their lives on the line every day, we've got to support them, who would do this terrible job? But in 1993, Rudy Giuliani ran for election and said he would reduce crime. In 1993, there were 2,100 murders in New York, and Rudy Giuliani

said “I am going to reduce crime in this city”, and everyone laughed - it was a joke. They said, “There’s racism, there’s housing, there’s dysfunctional families, you can’t do anything about it. You can try, you can try to detect it, you can report it, you can try to find the people who did it, but reduce crime?” But he was elected, he hired Bill Bratton, he told Bill Bratton to reduce crime, and something happened: Bill Bratton, with Rudy Giuliani’s help, did reduce crime, so that now there are about 500 murders a year in New York, a drop of about 75%.

Here’s where I get into the story. I came to New York in 1996 as an adviser to the Police Commissioner, after a long career in the Home Office. In 1998 I went to Philadelphia when they appointed a new chief. The Mayor of Philadelphia, Ed Rendell, had decided that he wanted to do the Giuliani trick - Giuliani had become very famous, he had reduced crime, he had made the city liveable in again, people came back - so in 1997, when there were 418 murders in Philadelphia, a city of 1.5 million, he hired John Timoney, who had been the number two in New York. I came with him as his Chief of Staff, and over the next three years, we knocked crime down, from 418 murders to about 296 murders, a drop of about 30%. It’s never gone back to 400 again. We didn’t do it by having fancy IT systems; it was done through leadership, by setting clear objectives, and by getting the cops to feel that they could do the job. Preventing crime, not detecting it, was the job we wanted to do, and they were provided with the resources and the political support by the Mayor to make it happen. I don’t want you to go away thinking that Bill Bratton and John Timoney are geniuses or magic workers: they weren’t. But before them, policing wasn’t seen as a crime reduction business. Policing was seen as a crime reporting business, as a detection business, and generally trying the best they can to keep a lid on it. What changed with Rudy Giuliani, and what changed with Ed Rendell was that mayors said, “We’re going to change this, we’re going to proactively reduce crime”, and once they said that, it happened. Why? Because cops are can-do people, and once it was said that fighting crime was their business, they decided to get down to doing it. Give people a clear objective, and they will react to it.

It’s the motivation, the leadership, the direction, the inspiration that makes the difference, and this is what brings me back to the arguments for Police and Crime Commissioners. I don’t think you can expect that kind of leadership, motivation and inspiration from a committee. At the moment our police forces are held to account by police authorities: they do a perfectly good job, but they do not have

'skin in the game', as businessmen say. No chief constable has ever been fired because crime has gone up; no chief constable has ever been fired because two years in a row, crime has gone up. That's not the way it is - crime is regarded as something that happens out there, people do it and we try our best. Similarly, no police authority chairman has ever been fired because crime has gone up. What I think will make the difference with Police and Crime Commissioners is that both commissioners and chief constables will be held to account for the level of crime and antisocial behaviour in this country. The Police and Crime Commissioner will be held to account by the electorate, and if at the end of the four years, crime is no different to how it was before, he's going to have a lot of explaining to do. If antisocial behaviour and drunkenness, and all the things that people complain about - the things that Helen Newlove spoke about - haven't changed in a particular patch, in a particular constituency, then the Police and Crime and Commissioner, elected with a mandate to make communities safer, is going to have a lot of explaining to do. Similarly, the Police and Crime Commissioner will have to look at the Chief Constable. If you set them clear objectives to reduce crime and antisocial behaviour, to stay in their patch and be concerned with the community, you will find an enormous difference.

We need the protection of an effective police service, and that, I believe, will be more likely to emerge from an arrangement where the police chief and the police commissioner are both accountable to the public, and are judged by their performance. I don't think the present arrangements allow for this - I think they're a bit vague, and the police authority thinks about other things, such as accountability, finance, guarding against corruption. All these things are very useful, but the number one objective of the police service is to make the community safer, and someone elected on that platform is, in my view, more likely to achieve this someone who has not been. There's another simple point about the local freedom of chief constables to manage. At the moment, there's far too much central direction: the Home Secretary is responsible for almost everything, and there's a culture of dependence now by chiefs, who look to the centre for guidance, for advice, for instructions and for targets. We're going to do away with all that, and at the same time that we're going to give local communities, through their elected representative, the authority to have a police force that suits them, we're going to free the police from the centre, and let them get on with it. This whole approach is about setting clear objectives, and then giving the police the tools - that's what lies at the bottom of this policy. It's not about tinkering with

local authority systems. It's about focusing on the real needs of the community for safety and security, giving someone the job to do that, and giving them the tools to get on with the job.

**Ian Loader**

*Professor of Criminology and Director of the Centre for Criminology, Oxford University*

I do, in a short while, want to turn to the question of what the practical implications of Police and Crime Commissioners might be, but of course, as Lord Wasserman indicated, the question of whether this is a good or bad idea is far from settled: there's a few rounds of parliamentary tussling to go, and the exact form that this reform will take is still, to some degree, up for grabs. With that in mind, I want to start by briefly recapping on some old ground. For me, Police and Crime Commissioners are one way of giving effect to three very important and valuable principles. There is, firstly, much to be said for trying to make police forces more responsive to their localities. In this country, we have experienced a century of people trying to run the police from Whitehall; in the last thirteen years, we've actually had instances of people trying to run the police force from Number 10! There seems to me to be good grounds for trying to decentralise the control, accountability and regulation of policing in this country. Secondly, it seems almost an article of faith to me that, in a democracy, questions to do with the strategic priorities of public services - key questions about resource allocation and the like - are taken by elected politicians, and not by unaccountable officials. We don't let teachers set education policy, we don't let doctors set health policy, and it's never been at all clear to me why we let chief constables make policing policy. To the extent that this is an attempt to do something about this situation, it has always had my support. Thirdly, if you are in a situation - as we are, in this country - where there are low levels of public trust in politics and politicians, and if one is faced with a crisis of democracy, you can one of two things: you can retreat, and close down avenues of democratic representation, and dialogue, or you can try to strengthen and extend democracy, try to experiment with new political institutions. Police and Crime Commissioners are one of the ways in which you can try to extend and strengthen the quality of our democracy.

I've never been convinced, however, that Police and Crime Commissioners are the best way of giving effect to those principles - if you'd pushed me, I would have gone for a model of elected police authorities. But we're not in that space, and I'm not about to reopen that discussion. As I said, there is a lot more tussling to go on in Parliament about the exact form this will take, and there are clearly a lot of serious issues - and they're not all matters of trivial detail - to do with getting the checks and balances right between Chief Constables, Police and Crime

Commissioners, Police and Crime Panels, and so forth. It also seems to me that, irrespective of how that pans out, there is going to remain a large degree of uncertainty, and therefore room for manoeuvre, in terms of how this works on the ground, for at least three reasons. The first reason is - that's just part of the point. If you are serious about decentralising policing, about not running the show from Whitehall, about questions of local accountability - in other words, if you want that really to happen, rather than just gesturing in that general direction, you can't specify in too much detail in advance exactly what the PCC model will look like in Derbyshire, or in Essex, or in Cumbria, or in Devon or Cornwall, precisely because it's going to depend on all kinds of local factors. There are, of course, risks with doing that, many of which have been regularly rehearsed. There are, also, potential benefits.

The second reason for this uncertainty, or the second 'known unknown', is this: it's often seemed to me that PCCs aren't best thought of as crime control innovation, they're best thought of as a piece of constitutional reform. This is an attempt to reorder the way in which we are governed, and to change in some modest but quite important ways some aspect of the relationship between the citizen and a very important public institution. A particular feature of any constitutional reform is that the authors of that reform are rarely in a position to determine how it gets played out on the ground, and that appears to be precisely the situation we're going to be in with respect to PCCs. The current government can say all sorts of things about how this is going to work, but it is in the nature of the beast that they are not going to be in a position to shape how this works when we get round to the business of electing 41 Police and Crime Commissioners next year. And that, of course, is the final piece of uncertainty - and, indeed, intrigue. At the moment, we just do not know who, if anyone, is going to put themselves forward for this office. We do not know if the political parties are going to organise themselves to put up candidates; we do not know whether the elections will therefore take shape on standard party political lines. So, we could end up in a situation where 41 existing police authority chairs end up being PCCs. We could - and from my point of view, this would be a rather depressing outcome - end up with 41 retired businessmen running the police force in this country. We could end up - and this is not so far fetched - with 120 serious candidates all running on identical manifestos to crack down on antisocial behaviour, for fear of being outflanked by their opponents. All of that might happen: we just don't know. It's also possible that a new range of candidates with skills, vision, the competence to do this job, actually come

forward, and that this becomes a case of democracy at its best. In other words, the elections may do what elections are meant to do, which is crystallise public discussion and debate around the issue of how you control and regulate crime and antisocial behaviour with the scarce resources that are available.

With that in mind, I want to turn to matters of practice. I've been trying to give some thought to the question of what we might want candidates for the office of Police and Crime Commissioner to be thinking about when they put themselves forward, and how they might conceptualise the role. I apologise for using the grubby word 'manifesto' in the same sentence as the word 'police', because I know that's what makes many people uncomfortable about this. But, for the sake of provoking a discussion, here is a manifesto of what a 'good' - and good is in inverted commas, because we're all likely to disagree on this question - Police and Crime Commissioner might do. There are six points, and I want to briefly run through them.

Firstly, they should pledge to be responsible. There's been a lot of nonsense written about this being 'un-English', and an assault on the constitutional traditions of the English police, in the midst of which there are some genuine concerns, and it strikes me that a good commissioner should precisely pledge not to trample over a chief constable's operational responsibility, not to go round sacking chiefs willy-nilly, not to make silly promises that they can't keep, or to resort to overblown, anti-crime rhetoric. It also seems to me very important - and I accept the point about there being value in having a named figure in a leadership role - that these people work closely and cooperatively with, among others, their Police and Crime Panels, not least because members of the Police and Crime Panel are rather more rooted in localities than Police and Crime Commissioners, who are, to take the example of Thames Valley, representing 2.4 million people and three English counties. In other words, commissioners should be in the business of trying, in practice, to avert many of the risks that people have identified with this particular measure.

Secondly, a good commissioner will, in my view, run an office for public engagement. In other words, an office that is routinely in the business of listening to and trying to elicit the experiences and concerns of ordinary people. Whatever else one thinks about this office, it is a rather unique type of constitutional position, and properly requires a rather unique and unusual, and in some ways new

type of politician. So, not someone who simply stands for election on a manifesto and says “I will be doing this for the next four years” - this is precisely what many critics fear - but someone who takes it to be their job to routinely elicit the concerns of all in their police force area, especially in those areas where crime and antisocial behaviour impacts most detrimentally - we know that crime is not an evenly-distributed social problem. Their job will be then to ensure, when setting strategic priorities, that those concerns are reflected in policing priorities, while remaining vigilant champions of the civil liberties of local minorities. It also seems to me that when public demands for policing cannot be met - and it's in the nature of the beast especially in times of fiscal constraint that not all public demands for policing can be met - that Commissioners should be open and honest with people about what the police can and cannot achieve by way of crime reduction.

Thirdly, a good commissioner would try to protect neighbourhood policing, in the context of fiscal constraint. Despite the warm protestations about neighbourhood policing that are routinely trotted out, there are all kinds of reasons why under-pressure neighbourhood policing is the first thing to be chipped away at and to go. One of the tasks of the Police Commissioner will be to try to ensure that that does not happen, and to work closely with the police to ensure that listening, and locally responsive policing, continues to happen on the ground. One of the most interesting aspects of this proposal is the idea that Police Commissioners will have grant-giving powers. That's actually a format where Police Commissioners can do some quite imaginative things, and use that grant-giving power - if they have any money - to try to galvanise civic action to cut crime and antisocial behaviour, precisely with the knowledge that the police cannot do all this alone.

Fourthly, Police and Crime Commissioners should develop holistic crime reduction, which is a posh way of saying that much of what impacts on crime in localities - and this is why I thought Lord Wasserman's account of the New York crime story was partial - is beyond the control of the police force and any Police Commissioner. A good Police Commissioner will know this, and not try and pretend otherwise. What this means in practice is that they must be in the business of trying to work effectively with all kinds of other organisations to coordinate local crime reduction strategies - whether this means working with the courts and probation to foster justice reinvestment and reduce reoffending, or paying attention to the impact of early years education, family support, the role of employment and so on. This isn't about saying, “This is nothing to do with me, it's all to do with social policy”, but

it is about trying to recognise that a large amount of crime *is* about social policy, and you're kidding everyone if you think that if only you get the police right, you're going to have dramatic effects on local crime levels.

Fifthly, Commissioners should be open to evidence about what works. We do know some stuff about what works to effectively reduce crime, and we do know that there are some things you can waste taxpayers' money on. In other words, the landscape here is not entirely flat. I am the last person in my trade who thinks that what politics means is reading criminology and putting it into practice. It doesn't mean that. But that doesn't mean you throw the baby out with the bathwater, and that you want elected officials who routinely disregard everything that is known about what does and does not work in crime reduction. A good commissioner is someone who will be open to the evidence about what works, and sees it as part of that role not only to apprise themselves of that information, and to try to find ways of injecting it into local public debate about crime and policing priorities.

Finally, they should take national responsibilities seriously. This is a bit clichéd and obvious in a way, but it's true that one of the concerns that people have about localising policing is that you will get 41 elected officials whose electoral success depends on getting things right locally, and that therefore operate in an incentive structure which means that they can actually disregard all kinds of national issues to do with policing, and disregard the fact that crime is a global problem that doesn't recognise the boundaries for dividing up police forces we happened to have arrived at in this country. A good commissioner will be someone who properly attends to local policing - that's the point - while also being mindful of the wider national picture in terms of cross-border crime, terrorism, and so on, and will also try to learn effectively in terms of other Police Commissioners. If you're going to maximise the benefit of this system - and this is consistent with trying to devolve and localise responsibility - you want Police and Crime Commissioners who talk to each other about what they're doing, who learn from experience in other police forces, and don't operate in some kind of windowless silo, because they think that their future depends just on getting things right in their particular area.

It remains to be seen whether any candidate comes forward with something like this menu of choice - still less, whether any candidate stands the remotest chance of electoral success if they come forward with something like this manifesto.

**Andrew Morley**

*Former Chief Executive, London Criminal Justice Partnership*

The Criminal Justice Alliance should be congratulated for finding the time and space to talk about Police and Crime Commissioners and crime, because I think there are some very significant opportunities. One of the things I want to do today is encourage us as a criminal justice community to mobilise, because it will require some very sophisticated individuals to operate in this space, and they will require the input and experience of the people in this room and the colleagues that we work with.

I'm not going to comment in too much detail around the political intent. However, I will make two comments. I was not persuaded by 'pure' Police Commissioners, for two reasons. Firstly, I didn't think there was enough for them to do. I am very much influenced by my experience with the Metropolitan Police Authority, which is a very good thing, and a significant improvement on what went before. But I have observed, at very close hand, the bureaucratic oversight, or the bureaucracy associated with that oversight, and the amount of paperwork, and I am not convinced that that was necessarily proportionate. I am also of the view that the very one-on-one relationship would increase the chances of the concerns around interference in operational independence, and all that comes with that. Having said that, I welcome the extension to crime. I think that this far better reflects public concern, which is about less crime and feeling safer. It also, critically, provides for the holistic and intelligent responses that crime requires: it's not just about more cops on the street, and it's not just about longer jail sentences. I am also very struck by what Lord Wasserman and Ian Loader were saying about being held to account. It's going to be very powerful at the end of the four years when you appeal to the electorate, and if all you say is "I've got more police officers", or "I've encouraged judges to send more people down", I think you've missed the point, because I don't think that's going to address what people worry about.

I come at this from the perspective of someone who's inhabited this space for five years. The London Criminal Justice Board, which started on issues of criminal justice process, increasingly started to extend its remit to broader crime reduction issues, including reducing reoffending activity, with, for instance, the Diamond Initiative, and Daedalus, which some colleagues will be aware of. So, I'm going to talk at a very practical level, and I'm going to use this opportunity to talk about how I feel Police and Crime Commissioners provide an opportunity to work through

some of those issues that really do undermine partnership working, and that sort of holistic response. I'm going to address this by talking about three areas, where there are significant opportunities and potential: one is around accountability; one is around data and evidence; and one is around innovation.

I'll start with accountability. One of the things I've always been struck by is that there is no one office, place or individual that is accountable for the crime and criminal justice process and the way in which it is experienced by the citizen. Whether you're a defendant, victim or an offender, you are passed from one agency to another, all of whom try to do a very good job - but where do you go, who do you speak to, who is responsible for holding all of that together and holding people to account? I think that the commissioners could provide a very helpful contribution to that. It also allows us to deal with something else, which I have always considered to be a bugbear: the entirely artificial divide between crime reduction and community safety, and criminal justice. It's all part of the same story, and yet I used to spend a significant amount of my time involved in territorial disputes about who was going to be responsible for this or that. Was it crime reduction, and therefore the local authority? Was it criminal justice, therefore the criminal justice agencies? I, quite often, was tempted to ape Bill Clinton, and say "It's all crime, stupid!" It also led to a plethora of partnership structures. I would speak about the same issue in two or three meetings, looking at it from slightly different angles, and that doesn't help.

I also think that we need to recognise that the citizen voice is important. If you look at the Louise Casey experience recently, we are increasingly having someone who speaks for the victim experience, even if we may not necessarily agree with everything she says. I think we desperately need that to be replicated at a local level, where people can talk about how it feels to be a victim of crime, and the experience that you receive. I also think the same can be said of offenders. We all know the very real issues that those offenders who decide they no longer wish to offend have in terms of accessing the services they need to turn their life around. So I do think, in terms of accountability, someone who can hold people together, someone who can speak for the citizen experience and cut through some of the nonsense and bureaucracy could be very powerful. But, to be clear on accountability, I am not arguing that this is about Police and Crime Commissioners running everything. What I am talking about is collective accountability for agreed priorities to an agreed plan to agreed delivery objectives. We've have had some

experience of that in London, and when it worked well, it worked very well indeed: if you look at things like the Diamond Initiative and Daedalus, we did galvanise a significant partnership activity to do things that were slightly different.

Whilst on the issue of statutory responsibilities, there is one issue that I think needs to be addressed - the relationship between probation and Police and Crime Commissioners. I've often thought, speaking from the London context - and I have to apologise for keeping referring to the Metropolitan experience, but it is where I'm from - that we have a regional probation trust, but the Mayor of London, who has the elected mandate, has no voice or say on that regional structure. I think there is a democratic deficit around that, and I'm not entirely sure that it is sustainable when we move into the world of Police and Crime Commissioners. I also think it is more than a matter of principle. I think that the police and probation relationship is a key, critical operational one, and I've always been of the view that putting the probation service within the justice family, as opposed to the Home Office family, does not necessarily reflect the operational activity on the ground. I can give you examples of how that does impact on the operational, from the experience of the Diamond Initiative, where we brought together police, probation, and local authority resettlement teams to respond to the needs of those serving less than twelve months when they came out of custody. Prior to that programme of work being there and those teams being brought together, local Safer Neighbourhood teams did not know who on their patch was subject to a community order. Even from a pure crime management and control perspective, not knowing who in your community are the people who are offending is a nonsense. It also meant that the police were not able to support probation with the discharge of their responsibilities. What we now have in London as a consequence is that everyone issued a community penalty is visited by a police officer from their local Safer Neighbourhood team, so that they know that the police know. For those where the address is wrong, or there is no fixed abode, we can start enforcement activity very quickly. For those who don't turn up to their first appointment because of their chaotic lifestyle, and because they didn't quite understand what it was that was required of them, it is a helpful reminder that they need to turn up. We have seen compliance for community penalties improve by just under a one-third. This is a very straightforward tactic, and is an example of the sort of influence that Police and Crime Commissioners can bring.

We also need to have some discussions around the national funding for victim support. I think there will always be a national infrastructure, but I do think, increasingly, we need to look at local victim support services, and at how we fund our victim services to ensure there is funding locally to meet local needs. Again, citing the London experience, there is a huge amount of inefficiency within the criminal justice process around trials that don't go ahead on the day - and a significant proportion of these don't go ahead on the day because victims and witnesses don't turn up. A significant proportion of those, in turn, are around domestic violence. There's some evidence to suggest that domestic violence advocates are very successful in helping people go through the process, but currently, a significant funding pressure means that funding around domestic violence advocates has been pretty much decimated. Who is best placed to make the link between the waste of the criminal justice system, and a very small investment in local services that may help with this? I think there may be some advantages with Police and Crime Commissioners in this area, as well.

I now want to move onto data and evidence. I absolutely agree with Ian, about this being much broader than policing - we really need to hold onto that. We now have a huge amount of data: we can map crime, we know where it happens, we know how often; we can also map offenders, we know where they live, we know what time they're likely to offend, and increasingly we know what their needs are. But I am not persuaded that we use all of this data and information as well as we might. Of course it's invaluable in determining priorities and plans, as well as in monitoring implementation. From a London perspective, one of the things that was most helpful - because we invested quite heavily in our analytical data - was being able to use that to ensure that partnership discussions were informed by fact. All too often, you would have a senior leader of one of the agencies, who would have visited one of their people on the front line, and had been told that things were not working because of an isolated incident, and that anecdote would be reported at strategic meetings and would take hold. We would spend hours, days, weeks, months, trying to solve a problem that was not a problem. So there is a case for data helping delivery.

I also think, with the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners, and with the loosening of national performance regimes, there is a real opportunity for PCCs to take a fresh look at what monitoring arrangements they need, and critically, for what purpose. Typically, the data we hold locally is about health of process, but

PCCs will have to demonstrate impact at the end of their four years - they will be looking at the measures that matter to people. I think that that allows us to have a very new relationship with the academic community. Currently, what happens is that someone has an idea - usually someone very senior, who has years of experience in the criminal justice field - and decides that they are going to have an initiative. Then we spend a significant amount of money commissioning an evaluation to tell us whether or not this is the silver bullet - and the truth is, it works sometimes in certain circumstances, maybe. And then we don't quite think about what we're going to do as a consequence. I think we now have a very real opportunity to sit down with the academic community and start to design our data and monitoring arrangements so that they do two things. They will have to speak to health of process - as a manager, you will need to understand what's working well, and what's not. But let's start understanding what data Ian and colleagues need to continually contribute to the evidence base. That will also require us to enter into a new relationship with the academic community, because I would go further and suggest that we need to start thinking about open access to data. We need to ensure that the academic community has unfettered access to that data, so that the research is able to happen on a more dynamic basis. It might mean that there are fewer flagship national projects evaluated, but given the more local agenda that's probably right. With the access to that data - and of course, there are protections that we would need to put in - it would allow us to identify where things are working well, and to look at why it is working well, and to secure funding from other sources. I think there is something in the new environment that will allow us to do that.

We also need to think about how our data can inform broader social inclusion activity and spend. Again, we sit on a huge amount of data. With all of the work we're doing currently around offender management programmes, primarily for those who are serving less than twelve months, we are developing a much more sophisticated understanding of individual offenders' needs. We are very good at using that information to inform the intervention for the individual, but we are not as good as we might be at using that information to inform local strategic decisions about social inclusion needs. I think Police and Crime Commissioners could be strong advocates for social inclusion. With the Diamond Initiative, we mapped where offenders were returning to. It was no great surprise that we were able to identify ten or twelve wards which were real 'hotspots' - where there was a strong correlation with social deprivation. If we can better understand what their

particular needs are, we can then speak to local authorities about how those needs are met, and maybe we can start to address some of those broader issues which contribute to crime. As part of the Diamond Initiative, we also did some skill-mapping work, and we found that there was a skills shortage around plumbers. We had, within our cohort, people who wanted to be plumbers. We had a college which ran plumbing courses, which had vacancies. We found out that there was an academic requirement - five GCSEs, A-E - that our group didn't have. Through a very simple discussion with the college, we could start to think how to access these opportunities for offenders. So, using the data and the evidence to inform more than just policing is very important.

Of course, I can't talk about data without talking about the issue of public access. I'm probably not where other people are, on publishing personal details of every individual in every case. But I do recognise that we need to be more open and transparent around performance and how we are doing, and be broader than just crime figures and reporting, and that sort of information. I think we need unfettered access for the academic community around our data; we also need to be brave about putting data out there so that members of the public can see and make judgments about the health of the crime agenda.

The other area where I think PCCs can be very helpful is around supporting innovation. In London, we have some examples of where this works very well, such as the Daedalus example. A wing was established at Feltham where young offenders had some support to help them into employment and training, and which was a partnership of something in the region of 18 agencies. It took the Mayor - it was one of his manifesto commitments - to bring them together, and to get them to think in a different way about how they could meet that particular need. I'm not pretending that it was the complete answer, but it was innovation. I'll give you an example of when there is a crying need for that sort of innovation and partnership response. In London, the NHS has done some work which identifies 300 young people who demonstrate serious emotional and behavioural issues, who present a serious risk of violence. In my twilight time at the London Criminal Justice Board, I was desperately trying to get someone to take accountability for them, because I think it is a scandal that a world-class city has identified 300 young people who are in need of support, help and assistance, and no one is in position to take accountability in terms of driving that forward. With Police and Crime Commissioners we could, for the first time, have someone to go to on this.

The other area around innovation is that we are, of course, very good at having a succession of projects, which we normally make great claims for - Daedalus is a case in point, I think the Mayor is now claiming that we've reduced the reoffending rate from 70% to 20%, which is complete nonsense! - and there's not much thought about what's going to happen afterwards. We need the opportunity to innovate, to test, to be brave, to be bold, but we still need someone to hold the ring about how it is you foster that, encourage that and mainstream that going forward - how you take the learning from it.

In all of this funding will be important. With the police grants, there's a critical mass of funding that could start to get things moving. But PCCs will need to be encouraged to be innovative and entrepreneurial about where they source their funding, because with many of the issues they are addressing, it's not just about statutory agencies. To use the London example again, we had something like 13 funding streams, and I now share the frustration that voluntary organisations have about trying to account to central government for your spend, because the amount of paperwork involved was significant. The funding envelope they are given by the state should be the beginning, not the end.

In closing, I think we need to recognise that this will require fairly sophisticated individuals and operators. My great fear isn't the businessmen, it isn't the police authority chairs - it's the retired chief constables, who decide that they might top up their pension with this! I'm not entirely persuaded that we have given enough thought to the sort of people who may run for election. I desperately hope it's not just done on party political lines - I hope that parties support independent candidates that have the right skill set. My plea to this audience is that the criminal justice community needs to mobilise. Whoever those individuals are, we have the expertise and the experience that will be invaluable in informing the activity, and I do believe that there are real opportunities to be exploited. Let's start talking.